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1  Background of this paper 
 
Private equity funds and hedge funds are both alternative asset classes that are continuously 
growing in importance. Although they have different focuses, they share some characteristics. 
First of all, both have or allegedly have a significant impact on the economy as well as the 
financial system they operate in. Therefore, the question of a potential regulation of both asset 
classes arises. Due to the lack of sophisticated knowledge about the differences of these asset 
classes, market players fear that attempts to regulate hedge funds will adversely affect private 
equity funds. Besides the regulatory issue, there are several other links between these two 
asset classes that have to be looked at. The relationship between those two asset classes is 
therefore of general importance.  
Last months’ developments in the hedge fund industry (e.g. rumors about turbulences as well 
as hedge funds forcing the dismissal of the CEO of Deutsche Börse AG) have now even led to 
a broad public debate about private equity and hedge funds. At least in Germany the debate 
has been partly fueled by the fact that both types of funds are highly funded by institutional 
investors from abroad. Due to this, the debate widened and included criticism on “Anglo-
Saxon style” capitalism as well. In the light of the last German elections, hedge funds and 
private equity funds have even been compared to locusts, notorious for exhausting companies. 
However, the distinction between hedge funds and private equity funds remains very vague in 
this discussion, so that deep mistrust is spread among the public opinion against these new, 
mostly unknown and misunderstood types of investors. 
 
For this reason it is important to: 
•  discuss the arguments for or against regulation, 
•  look at the major links between the two asset classes, 
•  look at the major differences that exist between the asset classes and 
•  conceive a set of criteria to clearly distinguish between both types of funds. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to comment on possible solutions to the above mentioned tasks. It 
outlines preliminary thoughts and findings. Further, it comments on the steps that we think 
should be taken to further enhance perception of private equity funds as opposed to hedge 




2  Regulation of hedge funds 
2.1  General aims of regulation 
 
In general, financial regulation is based either on an inherent instability of a financial market 
or on a lack of investor protection leading to potential market failure. With respect to the first 
concern, regulators are focused on behavior that could potentially destabilize the financial 
system. In the case of hedge funds, there are at least two factors that call for attention:  
•  the considerable use of leverage and 
•  the use of derivatives, and, especially, short selling. 
It is an open question, whether these two factors may be sufficient for causing an instability 
on global financial markets. However, the case of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
may serve as a warning of the potential danger inherent in hedge funds’ activities. Due to a   2
failed investment strategy, in September 1998 LTCM was unable to meet creditor demands. 
An intervention by the Federal Reserve prevented LTCM’s insolvency which was feared to 
severely destabilize financial markets.
1 As the size of funds under control of hedge funds 
today is by far larger than it was by the end of the nineties, it might be an interesting issue to 
reconsider the impact of globally acting hedge funds on worldwide financial stability. 
As far as the second issue is concerned it should be taken into account that hedge funds as 
well as private equity funds normally do not solicite retail investors. They are, in fact, 
financial intermediaries acting on behalf of sophisticated investors only. Although recently 
some exceptions to this rule have been experienced, the quest for regulation should not rest on 
investor protection issues as long as retail investors are not directly touched by these funds. 
This is especially true for private equity funds, as their limited partners normally are 
institutional investors only. Moreover, as far as the financial stability issue is concerned it 
should be noted that private equity funds leverage themselves, especially in the context of 
buy-out transactions, but they do so to a very much lower degree than arbitrage focused hedge 
funds. Finally, derivatives or short sellings play no role in a private equity investment 
strategy. For these reasons, their potential impact to harm the stability of the financial system 
is by no means comparable to hedge funds. 
 
 
2.2  Present SEC regulation of hedge funds 
 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has already taken a first step to regulate 
hedge funds – which might serve as a blueprint for other countries. In Germany, in order to 
cite an example, a working group of the ministries of finance, justice and economy has recent-
ly proposed to follow the US example
2. 
In 2005, the SEC adopted a new rule requiring advisers to certain private investment funds to 
register as “investment advisers” under the US Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The deci-
sion of the SEC to initially study the hedge fund industry
3 was based on the growth of the 
hedge fund assets paired with SEC’s lack of information about their investment pools. The 
staff was concerned that the Commission’s inability to examine hedge fund advisers would 
make it difficult to reveal fraud and other misconduct. Another concern was related to the 
manner by which hedge fund managers value hedge funds’ assets. The power of discretion 
they have and the lack of any independent review over that activity gave rise to questions 
about whether some hedge funds’ portfolio holdings are valued accurately. 
Although this rule is directed towards hedge funds and was never intended to include private 
equity funds, there are concerns that it might negatively affect private equity funds and other 
private investment funds as well. These concerns are based on three reasons: 
The major concern is the fact that both asset classes - at least in the US - rely heavily on funds 
from public institutions, such as state pension funds and university endowments. The SEC 
argues that pension fund investment would be a significant indicator of “retailization” of 
hedge funds
4. The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) therefore strongly objected 
the suggestion, that pension fund investment in a fund implicates the need to heighten SEC 
scrutiny
5. 
                                                 
1 Cf. Edwards (1999), p. 2. 
2 Cf. Riedel (2005), p. 24. 
3 Cf. SEC  (2003b). 
4 Cf. SEC (2004). 
5 Cf. NVCA p. 7f.   3
Secondly, hedge funds could pretend to be private equity funds in order to circumvent hedge 
fund regulation. For this reason the industry is interested in a clear distinction that cannot 
easily be misused. 
Thirdly, even if only the hedge fund industry would be regulated, it has to be feared that the 
hedge fund industry would publicly demand a private equity fund regulation in order to avoid 
competitive disadvantages between both asset classes.  
 
 
2.3  Limits to regulation 
 
International capital flows can only be regulated on an international level. A national solution 
would create a serious competitive disadvantage for one country without creating any positive 
impact for the stability of the financial system in general. The US market serves as a proof of 
this shortcoming of national regulation as hedge funds moved to offshore financial centers 
(e.g. Bahamas, Bermuda, Cayman Islands) to circumvent compliance with the new SEC rule. 
The only solution to this problem could be a world-wide regulation as the International 
Monetary Fund has been demanding for years. For the time being it is not clear how such a 
regulation should be taken into place. 
 
 
2.4  Self regulation 
 
Also it should be noted that the significant trend towards fund of fund approaches within the 
hedge fund industry has led to relatively high levels of control on processes and risk 
approaches exercised by the fund of fund managers over individual funds. Whether this de 
facto self control is sufficient remains subject to considerable debate. Additionally, at least for 
private equity, it has to be mentioned that the industry associations themselves aim at 




3  Similarities between the two asset classes 
 
The two asset classes share several common characteristics. Some of these exist between the 
two asset classes in general. Others are only valid between private equity and a certain sub-
group of hedge funds. This sub-group covers hedge funds whose investment strategy is 
comparable to that of private equity houses, i.e. acquiring stakes in companies and influencing 
corporate decisions. This may be true for the whole hedge fund or parts of the allocated 
capital. We refer to these market players in this paper as private equity-style hedge funds. 
However, a discussion about the potential convergence of private equity and hedge funds is 
greatly hindered by the fact that neither practice nor academia has yet come up with a 
systematic and broadly accepted definition of hedge funds and a classification of the various 
sub-groups of hedge funds.
6 The following description can therefore not build on that kind of 
(necessary) fundament. However, it tries to show the broad range of potential economic links. 
 
                                                 
6 Cf. Edwards (1999), p. 4; Das et al. (2002), pp. 12f.; Getmansky (2004), p. 4.   4
3.1  Private equity funds and hedge funds 
 
Both asset classes address institutional investors for fundraising. In their effort to increase 
capital allocation in alternative asset classes with a focus on absolute returns, institutional 
investors mainly resort to hedge funds and private equity funds, as these are not the only, but 
the major choice of alternative investments. For this reason, private equity funds and hedge 
funds compete in the fundraising process. While this applies for the general case between the 
two asset classes, it is especially true with regard to private equity funds and the sub-group of 
hedge funds that is equity-focused.  As a response to this pressure, some private equity funds 
(such as Texas Pacific Group) team up with hedge funds to jointly compete for funds.
7  
 
Furthermore, some hedge-fund-of-funds  also invest in private equity. UBS Global Asset 
Management for example is reported to launch a hedge-fund-of-funds in summer 2005 in 
Germany that also aims to invest in private equity
8. In the course of the presentation of this 
new product it was stressed that UBS believes in a merger of the world of hedge funds and the 
one of non-hedge funds.  Instead of the investment strategy, the difference between absolute 
and relative return strategies would serve as a factor to distinguish funds in the future.
9 
 
Apart from that, some institutions offer hedge funds and private equity funds under one 
umbrella. Examples for this are Fortress and Partners Group. These institutions may develop 
by means of internal growth, but they can also be created through a business combination of 
existing entities. In the US there have been mergers of hedge funds and private equity funds. 
The private equity player AEA Investors and the hedge fund manager Aetos Capital for 
example merged in order to create one big fund.
10 
 
Instead of always competing sometimes both entities work together. Hedge funds are an 
important buyer of the junk bonds that private equity funds issue in order to finance the deal. 
On a positive note, this means that hedge funds facilitate the private equity business. 
However, discussions about the stability of the hedge fund industry might therefore also 
endanger private equity deals.  
 
Finally, both fund types have some structural characteristics in common. They are typically 
organized as limited partnerships. While the investors are limited partners, managers (mostly 
represented by an entity advising the fund vehicle) are general partners. Compensation 
systems are also quite similar as they are charged on a performance basis.
11 Both types of 
funds show similar characteristics in their relationship towards investors, as they fulfill the 
definition of private funds.
12 And they both have the problem of a low transparency of the 
underlying. This, however, is less of an issue for private equity investments as carry is not 
paid on an annually mark-to-market basis.
13  
  
                                                 
7   Cf. Thornton/Zegel (2005), p. 1. 
8   Cf. Narat (2005), p. 34. 
9   Cf. Narat (2005), p. 34. 
10  Cf. Rettberg (2005), p. 23. 
11  Cf. Fung/Hsieh (1999), pp. 1f. 
12  Cf. Heesen (2004), p. 71; SEC (2005). 
13  Cf. Borello/Bader (2004).   5
3.2  Private equity funds and private equity-style hedge funds 
 
Private equity-style hedge funds are not a theoretical concept, but are already active market 
players. According to Business Week, private equity-style hedge funds completed at least 23 
deals valued at about $30 billion in 2004.
14 This sub-group of hedge funds shares more 
similarities with private equity funds than regular hedge funds. Private equity and this sub-
group of hedge funds compete against and potentially complement each other at the same 
time. 
 
Firstly, they compete for investors. The competition between private equity funds and hedge 
funds in general, which we already mentioned above, takes place on the market for distinct 
asset classes in the orbit of alternative assets for investors. The sub-group of equity hedge 
funds (which is another class not exclusively, but also including private equity-style hedge 
fund) and private equity funds could be seen as perfect investment alternatives.
15 Equity 
hedge funds in this context are defined as those hedge funds that follow strategies, which have 
an implied correlation to equity markets (e.g. through holding long and short positions, or 
through merger arbitrage transactions). 
Some argue that this similarity would not exclusively have disadvantages. Instead of 
considering investments into equity hedge funds as substitutes for private equity, the former 
could be used as a tool to manage the committed, but un-invested private equity capital.
16 
However, calling capital that is not yet needed for investments in order to invest in equity 
hedge funds would considerably change the business model of private equity investments. 
There could be a rationale to due so, because investors could plan better. This would mean 
that private equity funds would move into the hedge fund arena. 
Secondly, they compete for investment opportunities. This is not true for the whole spectrum 
of private equity investments but for buyouts, especially big ones. The increased competition 
for deals entails higher prices and thus reduces the potential returns, e.g. in the case of Texas 
Genco or Toys’R’Us. However, it has to be noted, that the growing similarities between the 
two fund types in this case are also driven by the movement of the private equity industry into 
public markets.  
Apart from the public capital market, the competition for investment opportunities also relates 
to the private capital market in the form of mezzanine finance and distressed lending
17. Hedge 
funds start not only to buy whole debt portfolios but increasingly also single debt positions. 
For instance, in the German Mittelstand hedge funds buy distressed debt and later on they 
restructure the company.
18 So-called vulture funds have long been active in US distressed 
situations. Due to this behavior the general public opinion might mistake hedge funds’ 
behavior to be similar to the involvement of private equity companies. 
However, there is an argument that hedge funds will break into the private equity field only in 
limited cases while the other way around seems more probable. Apart from the idea to 
allocate not yet invested capital in hedge funds, private equity companies might start to 
launch hedge funds. The installment of a hedge fund arm would give private equity funds the 
possibility to better capitalize their extensive due diligence – in case they reject investing 
private equity they could still provide financing in different ways through their hedge fund 
arm.
19 As reported, The Carlyle Group for example plans to launch a hedge fund of funds as 
an initial step followed by its own hedge fund later this year. As already mentioned above, 
                                                 
14  Cf. Thornton/Zegel (2005), p. 1. 
15 Cf. Borello/Bader (2004). 
16 Cf. Borello/Bader (2004). 
17 Cf. Briefel/Mariathasan (2005), p. 22. 
18 Cf. Köhler (2005), p. 26. 
19 Cf. Davies (2005) for the following estimates.   6




Further, as the gap between both business models narrows, private equity funds and private 
equity-style hedge funds also compete for talent. This is not only true for new graduates 
entering the job market but especially for experienced professionals of the private equity 
scene. The latter are especially important for hedge funds in their effort to build-up expertise 
which is a prerequisite for broadening their business model in the direction of private equity 
markets. Consequently, personnel costs can be expected to rise. Indeed it is already argued 
that mid-ranking private equity professionals were seeing big increases in compensation. 
Some recruiters even say US and European private equity partners would take pay cuts to 
keep staff from leaving for higher-paying hedge funds.
21 
 
Despite the competition between the two types of funds, the emergence of hedge funds 
investing private equity style brings along an advantage for both parties: syndication of deals 
is facilitated as the number of active market players increases. An example for this is the 
merger of US Airways and America West that is mainly driven by Texas Pacific Group. Two 
hedge funds will participate in the equity offering necessary to finance the merger. Another 
example is Horizon Natural Resources financed by a consortium of hedge funds and private 
equity funds. 
 
With regard to the public opinion, the similar behavior of both types of funds influences the 
perception of each class. In the course of the public debate both groups are often referred to 
under the common label of “financial investors”. In Germany both were labeled as locusts 
without any distinction of the business models. 
As a side note, the behavior of hedge funds may also influence the perception of private 
equity funds as the former shares some characteristics with the notorious vulture funds. The 




4  Major differences between private equity funds and hedge 
funds 
4.1  Differences between the two business models 
 
The major differences between private equity funds and hedge funds are both the time horizon 
of the investment and the investment strategy. 
Private equity funds are long-term oriented investors in portfolio companies. They are 
structured as closed-end-funds which bound their investors for around seven to nine years. 
Private equity funds mostly focus on private companies, in which they invest for several years 
and get involved in the management in order to foster the corporate development. However, 
in the case of public to private (PIPE) transactions, they acquire stakes in public companies to 
take them private afterwards. In order to seize control or at least have a strong influence on a 
portfolio company, private equity funds usually aim at owning majority stakes.  
                                                 
20 Cf. Alt Assets (2005); Thornton/Zegel (2005), p. 1. 
21 Cf. Butcher (without year).   7
Hedge funds on the contrary are short-term investors usually allowing their investors to 
retrieve their money on a monthly or quarterly basis, even though in some case the 
redemption period might be significantly longer. For this reason, hedge funds cannot exploit 
mispricing that tends to be dissolved only in the long run. This might cause a specific short-
term thinking in their investment strategies. From this it becomes clear why a hedge fund 
normally would not buy a majority stake in a company that needs to be turned around, as such 
a strategy normally takes several years. This is why they might prefer to bet on exerting 
pressure on the management of a publicly traded company with the goal to cause a short-term 
price reaction on the stock market. Although it is not put into question that this may cause 
also a long-term value increase in the company, it has to be emphasized that this approach is 
quite different from how a private equity fund would try to exploit a perceived underpricing 
of a company. 
For this reason the SEC focuses on the redemption and liquidity aspect that is typical for 
hedge funds, in order to distinguish them from the broader range of other private funds, i.e. 
also private equity funds.
22 Their new rule applies to funds that permit investors to redeem or 
withdraw their interests within two years of purchase. 
The long-term/short-term-argument is extremely powerful. It is easily understood. Apart from 
that, the long-term attitude of private equity companies is in striking contrast to the behavior 
of the so called locusts which stay by definition only for a very short time. It is striking that 
the time horizon has not been used more consequently in the public debate about the differing 
behavior of the two sorts of funds and its potential outcome.  
Bearing in mind the different time horizon it becomes obvious that hedge funds can – unlike 
private equity funds – not set a strategic agenda in a portfolio company. On the contrary, they 
can only generate profits by making use of undervaluation that can be partially dissolved in a 
short-term. One example of this is the activism vis-à-vis Deutsche Börse to distribute retained 
profits to shareholders. Gaining a profit that way, however, can be seen much more 
skeptically by the public then a profit earned through serious operative involvement. 
Additionally, it should be taken into account that due to this short-term focus under some 
circumstances hedge funds might not be interested in betting on a perceived undervaluation, 
whereas private equity funds might do so. This is always the case, if it is agreed upon that 
undervaluation will only be recitified after a time and effort consuming change of incumbent 
management and strategic redirection of a company. Although it is very important for the 
well-being of a society that these kind of companies will be taken over, hedge funds might 
refrain from doing so as the pay-off of such a strategy will accrue only in the long run. Hence, 




4.2  Limitations to this distinction 
 
However, there are two limitations to this distinction. Firstly, there is an ongoing development 
in the industry concerning these criteria. The hedge fund industry is moving in two different 
directions
23: one even enhancing liquidity for clients, the other demanding a longer time-
horizon. A major aspect is that hedge funds have good strategic reasons to reconsider their 
short-term-orientation. More restrictive redemption and liquidation rights allow funds to 
increase their time horizon of their investment strategy. This prolonged investment horizon 
leaves enough time to hedge funds to build-up an organization including infrastructure and 
                                                 
22 Cf. Collins (2004). 
23 Cf. Ferro (2005a), p. b03.   8
talent in order to pursue complex, illiquid, long-term investments – i.e. private equity-type 
investments. As an effect one might expect other hedge funds to follow the example provided 
by The Children’s Investment Fund (TCI) that imposed a two year lock up-period on its 
investors. Comparably favorable funding conditions allow certain hedge funds to operate 
more on a long-term basis as the case of Deutsche Börse AG has shown. Some established, 
very successful funds have therefore convinced investors to allocate their capital for one, two 
and in some cases even up to five years.
24 
The number of hedge funds being able to use a similar strategy than private equity funds 
seems to be quite restricted according to some sources
25. StratCom, a US research and 
consultancy firm, estimates that out of more than 9,000 existing hedge funds worldwide, at 
most twenty hedge funds are capable of challenging private equity funds in mega buy-outs
26. 
Carlyle’s David Rubenstein mentioned 16 hedge funds with serious capital allocated to 
private equity strategies, including Cerberus, Highland Capital, Och-Ziff Capital and George 
Soros. Other sources claim that several hedge funds are building up “side-pockets” (i.e. 
capital they can dispose of over a longer period than the regular 1 year funding), which could 
be used for private equity-style investments. As these side pockets are said to account for 
between 10% and 20% of the funds’ value, hedge funds would dispose of a war chest big 




Secondly, apart from this change in the business model, it seems probable that some hedge 
funds  misuse this exclusive focus on the length-criterion. By adjusting their investment 
conditions, they might be qualified as private equity funds and thus circumvent regulation. 
 
Up to now, the time period of capital commitment that hedge funds choose is still signi-
ficantly shorter than the commitment period of private equity funds. However, this criterion 
proves to be far too diffuse and imprecise for regulatory purposes. Even if the SEC would 
change the time span it uses to differentiate from two years (as it is today) to five years or 




5  Distinction of funds by selected criteria 
5.1  Empirical criteria of distinction identified by the SEC 
 
As shown above, one single criterion does not seem to be sufficient to distinguish between 
private equity funds and hedge funds. As the SEC’s release and the subsequent  report 




                                                 
24 Cf. Ferro (2005b), p.38. 
25 Cf. Davies (2005) for the following estimates. 
26 Cf. also Briefel/Mariathasan (2005), S.22. 
27 Cf. Anonymous author (2005). 
28 Cf. SEC (2003a), pp. 3ff.; Collins (2004), p. 21.   9
Criterion  Hedge funds  Private equity funds 
investment 
strategy 
public markets and liquid 
assets 
private markets, investments in opera-
ting companies and illiquid privately 
negotiated positions 
return strategy  absolute return strategy  absolute return strategy depending on 
portfolio company development 
trading 
frequency 




use of public market instru-
ments, such as securities, deri-
vatives and short-selling 
special-situation use of derivative 
instruments to preserve unrealized gain 
use of leverage  heavy use of leverage  use of leverage 
fund structure  fund structure with open 
periodic admissions and 
redemptions of investors  
closed-end fund with no withdrawal or 
redemption except for regulatory 
reasons 
payment modus  up-front payment of investor 
commitment  
payment of investors’ commitment as 





dent of involvement in com-
pany management 
close oversight or involvement with 
company management, regularly also 
supervisory board seats 
 
 
5.2  Additional criteria 
 
In addition to the criteria used by the SEC, other characteristics could be also used to 
distinguish between the two funds: 
 
 
Criterion  Hedge funds  Private equity funds 
investors





managers significantly invest 
their own money  




minority often  majority 
number of port-
folio companies 
potentially small, as hedge 
funds exploit highly selected 
investment opportunities and 
do not follow a systematic 
approach of screening potential 
investments to build up a 
sizable portfolio 
generally high (i.e. 10 or more) in order 




90% of hedge funds are 
hedged
30, as the original con-
generally not hedged 
                                                 
29 Cf. Heesen (2004), p. 71. 
30 Cf. Das et al. (2002), p. 13.   10
cept of hedge funds is to capi-
talize on market imperfections 
(arbitrage opportunities) while 





public companies  exclusively private companies; however, 
private equity funds might hold stakes 
during the lock-up period in former 




completely unrestricted  strongly restricted due to:  
a) contractual stipulations (investment 
agreement), which limit investment 
universe with regard to company 
location, industry, maximum capital 
allocation per portfolio company, 
etc.
31 
b) specialization of managers with 
regard to industry know-how, 
network of partners, etc.
32  
fee structure
33  2% management fee plus 20% 
of outperformance 
2% management fee plus 20% of 
outperformance,  
but: hurdle rate of 8% 
calculation of 
share of profit 
calculated and earned on an 
annual basis mark to market on 
unrealized gains and losses 
only on realized gains which means only 
in the last 2 or 3 years of a fund  
payment of 
profit 
on an annual basis  as gains have to be realized, in general 
only in the last 2 or 3 years of a fund  
 
 
The fee structure and calculation of the profit share seems to be a potentially powerful 
argument in the public debate. Obviously, the private equity industry’s compensation and 
incentive schemes focus on long-term realized gains – with emphasis on realized gains.   
Hedge funds, however, get usually short term profits – based on gains that are still unrealized, 
i.e. theoretically (mark-to-market) calculated. This comes back to the maxim: Hedge funds 
make money, private equity funds create value. 
 
With regard to a fund’s investors another argument is valid: Hedge funds investing in private 
equity might “fool” investors who have up-front decided to which degree they want to invest 
in hedge funds or private equity funds – and have attached different remuneration schemes to 
that too. Most hedge fund investment agreements typically give managers the flexibility to in-
vest up to a stated limit in private equity and this limit has been increasing to a level of as 
much as 30% for some firms.
34 However, this is still not in the best interest of the investor. 
If hedge funds end up in the private equity business, investors are as hedged in their invest-
ments as they thought they would be, because private equity investments – unlike other hedge 
fund investments – cannot be generally hedged. On the contrary, due to a smaller size of port-
folios, investments are even more risky than they would have been in the private equity orbit. 
And investors “pay” for this not along the lines of private equity remuneration but on an an-
nually, mark-to-market basis without a hurdle rate.  
                                                 
31 Cf. Anonymous author (2005). 
32 Cf. Goldstein (2005), p. 4. 
33 See for fee structure, calculation and earning in detail  Spangler (2005). 
34 Cf. Briefel/Mariathasan (2005), p.22.   11
For this reason it is in the very interest of investors themselves that either there is a clearer 
line between hedge fund and private equity investment or that remuneration schemes are 
changed. If markets are indeed converging, investors should demand the same fee structure. 
From their perspective, it does not make sense to invest in private equity on hedge fund terms. 
 
 
5.3  Exceptions from the criteria defined above 
 
Coming back to the differentiating criteria between hedge funds and private equity funds, it is 
however noteworthy to add that the description of the two funds provided above portraits the 
general forms. To capture general movements and recent developments of the market, it is 
necessary to look at these characteristics in greater detail. Some deviations have already been 
mentioned. To encompass all of them would call for more thorough research. 
The latter would be of importance in order to define a clear line. Otherwise critics would say 
that the formula is based on a business model already changing. On the other hand one should 
bare in mind developments that one does not want to impede. Whatever distinctive criteria are 
chosen, these should be flexible enough to remain applicable in this dynamic environment.  
 
Some examples of concrete deviations from the patterns described above:  
 
 
Criterion  Hedge funds  Private equity funds 
investment 
strategy 
also invest in non-public 
companies: Investments in 
distressed debt of German Mit-
telstand companies and 
restructuring of the latter 
also increasingly invest in public com-
panies, aiming at taking them private as 





lock up periods of one, two or 
up to five years 
some funds permit limited redemption 
or withdrawal rights, but only for un-
foreseen or extraordinary circumstances 
fee structure  “high-water mark” (hurdle rate 
equivalent)




also majority stakes (as in the 








also private companies  also public companies  
                                                 
35 Cf. Collins (2004). 
36 Cf. Getmansky (2004), p. 5. 




activist  no true value adding approach but rela-
tive quick exit, e.g. criticized in the case 
of Serona Dental (tertiary)






not restricted to any type of 
investment
40 




Apart from a defining line towards hedge funds a clear distinction between vulture funds and 
private equity funds is needed. As mentioned, vulture funds also act with a short-term 
perspective even shorter than hedge funds. Therefore their behavior might negatively impact 
the debate if they are mixed up with private equity funds in general or if they are considered 
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